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Books in Review
Marc Bousquet, How the University Works:
Higher Education and the Low-Wage
Nation (New York: New York University
Press, 2008).
Gerry Canavan

Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI
We have taken the great leap forward and said, “Let’s pretend we are a corporation.”
—John Lombardi, former president of the University of Florida, in 1997
This oft-quoted line, which serves as the epigraph for the introduction of Marc Bousquet’s 2008 How the
University Works, first appeared in a 1997 Business Week profile of Lombardi headlined “The New
University.”1 In it, Lombardi is figured as the half-willing reformer-destroyer of a state university system
whose legislature overseers “won’t let him raise tuition but has cut university appropriations by 15%
since 1991,” who has no choice left but to run the campus like a business. Lombardi is regretful, but

stoic. Forcing departments at the University of Florida to compete for slices of $2 million in
supplemental funding by demonstrating productivity and profitability may have been destructive of
educational priorities, but it was also “the new reality,” a reality which Lombardi was simply among the
first to recognize.
The reference to China’s disastrous Great Leap Forward may or may not have been intentional,
but it certainly is evocative. This is, after all, precisely the tension between academic praxis and
managerial “excellence” that led Bill Readings to declare the university “in ruins” in 1996.2 That same
year, Bousquet—then a graduate student at the City College of New York, now a tenured associate
professor in the English department at Santa Clara University—helped spearhead awareness of graduate
student and contingent faculty issues at the 1996 MLA convention, a foundational moment in what has
since become known as the “Contingent Faculty Movement.” An issue of the journal Works & Days was
devoted to his and others’ work on contingent faculty issues in 2003. And, with How the University
Works, he takes his place with Readings and Christopher Newfield (Ivy and Industry, 2004; Unmaking the
Public University, 2008) as one of the premier theorists of the contemporary corporate university.
Bousquet begins with a pointed rejection of the Lapsarian myth-making that typically
characterizes discussions about what has happened to the University in recent decades, a notion that
due to pernicious external influence or betrayal from within the purity of the University has somehow
been corrupted. Bousquet’s University is not the victim of late capitalism; it is its agent. As Bousquet
puts it: “Late capitalism doesn’t just happen to the university; the university makes late capitalism
happen.”3 An analysis of the student as already a worker forms an important part of this picture, as we
will see—but it is worth taking a moment to simply peruse Bousquet’s prodigious list of intersections
between university capital and late capitalism writ large:
apparel sales; sports marketing; corporate-financed research, curriculum, endowment, and
building; job training; direct financial investment via portfolios, pensions, and cooperative
venture; the production and enclosure of intellectual property; the selection of vendors for
books, information technology, soda pop, and construction; the purchase and provision of
nonstandard labor; and so forth.4
That’s an awful lot being monetized at “not-for-profit” institutions. And most of these functions have
little or nothing to do with humanistic paeans to the “value” of a liberal education or the fantasy of the
pure pursuit of knowledge for its own sake; in fact, the intellectual mission of the University rapidly
recedes into the background as a type of side business, if not, indeed, a kind of hobby. There’s more
truth than we might at first admit to the truistic assertion that NYU (to pick for a moment on the
corporate entity responsible, among other things, for the publication and distribution of Bousquet’s
critique) is a real-estate trust running a college for tax purposes.
This corporatist ethos is not the fault of for-profit schools like the University of Phoenix, who still
capture just a tiny portion of the market of education. Nor is it explained by the hopeless rhetoric of
“realists” like Lombardi who speak gravely of economic necessity, corporate “partnerships,” and “the
bottom line.” It is rather, Bousquet argues, the deliberate choice of a management culture in university
administration that has self-consciously stylized itself after Wall Street, with superstar CEOs,
disproportionately high administrative salaries, and recklessly expensive, resource-squandering pet
projects. “The university under managerial domination is an accumulation machine,” Bousquet writes;
money squeezed from curriculum, faculty compensation, and student financial aid flows into a

discretionary fund to be used by university higher-ups as they see fit, with little or no oversight from
students, faculty, or the surrounding community at large. 5
The explosion in administrative salaries to near-CEO levels becomes in this way a particularly
scandalous component of the university’s, with high-level university administrators regularly drawing
salaries of a half a million dollars or more. Duke University, Polygraph’s home institution, has paid
basketball coach Mike Krzyzewski at least $1.5 million dollars a year since 2005while paying its full-time
service workers $10 an hour—a minimum that was only extended campus-wide in 2007.6 In How the
University Works Bousquet catches Harvard paying the individual managing a single sector of the
university endowment $17 million while compensating its lowest-paid workers just $17,000 per year.7
This last aspect of the business of the University—the endowment as investment portfolio—
deserves additional scrutiny in the wake of the spectacular collapse of the international finance market
in the last half of 2008. It wasn’t so long ago, after all—only November 2007—that a Boston Globe
headline proclaimed “Risk Pays Off for Endowments.”8 In that story Robert Weisman reported on a new
study from Harvard Business School professor John Lerner and two graduate students, Antoinette
Schoar and Jialan Wang, called “Secrets of the Academy: The Drivers of University Endowment Success,”
which traced the massive growth in university endowments since 1991.9 A billion dollars invested in a
typical university endowment, Lerner et al found, had become $3.68 billion dollars by the end of 2005, a
growth of 10% per year or 268% overall—slightly less than that the comparative 278% growth of the
Standard & Poor index over that time, though certainly nothing to sneeze at. But endowments at socalled “Ivy Plus” universities—Ivy League schools like Harvard, Yale, and Princeton alongside upstart
rivals like MIT, Stanford, the California Institute of Technology, and Duke—turned that same billion
dollars into $5.88 billion, a gain of 488%, an annual return of 13.8%. The Ivy Plus universities achieved
this lopsided success through high investment in “alternative assets,” i.e., hedge funds and real estate.
Yale University in particular is singled out in the report for having 69% of its endowment targeted at
these sorts of illiquid investments at the end of fiscal year 2006.
These high levels of return on investment did not go unnoticed. Bloomberg News reported in
July 2008 that donation to university endowment was actually becoming a new and highly lucrative
investment strategy for rich alumni.10 Under the terms of an endowment-linked trust plan at one of
these “Ivy Plus” universities, the principal of the trust becomes the property of the university upon the
donor’s death. In the meantime, the donor receives income each quarter from the trust matching the
endowment’s own returns—returns which, the article hastens to note, had outperformed mutual funds
every year for a decade.
This new class of investment had been made possible by a 2003 IRS ruling that eased restrictions
on the taxability of some returns generated by “nonprofit” charitable trusts like the university
endowments. Now investments in one of these “charitable trusts” can tap into the full investment
portfolio of a university endowment while remaining free of capital gains taxes and even still qualifying
for an income-tax reduction like any other charitable donation. Harvard, which was the first university to
receive IRS clearance to offer such an investment portfolio, had 700 such trusts (with a combined value
of a billion dollars) linked to its endowment in 2007.
The university, in short, isn’t just saying “Let’s pretend we’re a corporation.” No one’s
pretending. The university is an investment firm with a tax deduction.
And, like any investment firm, the university is now suffering badly in the market downturn
caused by the credit crisis. Returns from college endowments were down 22.5% on average in the first
six months of fiscal year 2009, which began in July 2008, according to a report from the Commonfund

Institute and the National Association of College and University Business Officers. Nearly all of these
losses have come in the wake of October 2008’s stock market crash.11 (These endowments had already
posted slimmer losses of 2.7% for fiscal year 2008.) These losses cut equally across cash-rich and cashpoor universities alike, with the Ivy Plus losses staggering in terms of raw numbers. Duke University
alone lost a billion dollars from its endowment, nearly 20% of its total value.12 Harvard, with the largest
endowment in the country, lost 22% of its value during this same time—about $8 billion in losses, more
than the total endowments of all but six American universities, with additional losses likely to mount as
its real estate and private equity holdings are revalued downward.13 Harvard says it is expecting a 30%
loss in total endowment value by the end of 2009.
Some universities, like Columbia Law, NYU, Tufts, and Brown, are even reporting losses
stemming from the infamous Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme.14 Yeshiva University, the worst hit, lost $14.5
million that they been led to believe was worth $110 million—almost a tenth of the original stated value
of its endowment.15
The credit crunch has had secondary effects beyond immediate loss of investment. Having
become accustomed to tapping endowments, and now facing diminished support from both private
donors and state legislatures, colleges are having difficulty making operating expenses; at both public
and private universities, cuts are everywhere: in departmental budgets, in building projects, in offered
services, and in staff layoffs and faculty buyouts.16 If we are good students of Bousquet, that final
category cannot pass without comment—a financial crisis at a university naturally results in buyouts for
university administrators and tenured faculty but in cancelled contracts for adjuncts, support staff,
graduate students, and everybody else.
Anyone unlucky enough to be on the job market this year has seen firsthand the number of
searches cancelled; InsiderHigherEd.com put the number of postings in the Modern Language
Association’s Job Information List down 21% for 2008- 2009, the worst decline in the organization’s
thirty-four years, and the high-trafficked English Literature job wiki lists over seventy-five announced
searches that were later cancelled or postponed—all in just one discipline.17
As the book’s punning title suggests, to understand how the university works we must recognize
both how it functions and how it labors—or, more properly, how it systematically exploits the labor of
those in and around it, successfully employing its nonprofit educational mission as a smokescreen to
avoid scrutiny and even basic regulation. In one of the book’s most remarkable chapters, Bousquet
provides the details of the “enterprise partnership” between UPS, the city of Louisville, and several of its
campuses.18 Students sign contracts with an organization called Metropolitan College, which offers no
degrees or classes and functions purely as a labor subcontractor. In exchange for a commitment to work
late night hours on an as-needed basis at low wages, students receive tuition remission at local colleges
like the University of Kentucky (though most are steered towards cheaper community colleges to save
UPS money in benefits). When students fail or drop courses due to the exhaustion inevitably caused by
this grueling second-shift labor, UPS doesn’t pay the benefit at all, leaving the student worker in debt
with nothing to show for it—so it should come as no surprise that after a decade of the program, only
300 students have actually received a degree. This striking lack of academic success is no accident,
Bousquet shows; in fact, it’s the whole point. The program is designed so that its studentworkers will
fail, as that failure ties them down for years at a time to miniscule wages in an otherwise high-turnover,
low-benefits position, all in pursuit of a fantasy bribe: a college degree.
But there is no fantasy bribe that Bousquet holds in greater contempt than the tenure system
itself. The bulk of the book’s critical attention (and ire) is directed at the rhetoric of the academic “job

market,” which in accordance with the economic ideology from which it is derived suggests that newly
minted Ph.D.s, having completed their pedagogical training, compete against each other in a free labor
market for desirable jobs. That “supply” of potential professors outstrips “demand” at any given
moment is consequently coded as a regrettable economic reality (caused by external factors x, y, and z)
that will naturally correct itself as the aging cohort of current tenure holders begins to retire, an event
perpetually said to be five or so years off.19 In addition to absolving tenured faculty to the injustices of a
system with which they are complicit, such a rhetoric secondarily slides the onus of responsibility away
from systemic failure onto the individual. Any Ph.D. who fails to get hired was obviously hawking an
inferior product: herself.
In fact, Bousquet demonstrates, there is no market in jobs. Graduate education is better
understood as a machine for producing cheap, contingent, “just-in-time” teaching labor, and far from
somehow “failing” it is actually succeeding quite well. The holder of a Ph.D., in this calculus, is but a
systemic waste product, which must be “flushed away” to ensure the continued flow of new, cheap
laborers to fuel the machine. We should not be surprised, then, to find starting deficiencies in graduate
student support, or degree achievement rates of 20% to 40% in the humanities, or a dearth in quality
jobs for Ph.D. holders, or even that the attainment of the Ph.D. suddenly renders you “unqualified” to
teach even the low-wage teaching jobs that paid the bills while you achieved it. And this is why, as
Bousquet memorably puts the point, “in many disciplines, for the majority of graduates, the Ph.D.
indicates the logical conclusion of an academic career”: given the machine’s real aims, how could it be
otherwise?
Bousquet evinces a clear feeling of betrayal towards the generation of tenured faculty that
allowed this situation to develop without any significant resistance. (This is where Bousquet’s own
tendencies towards Lapsarianism emerge most clearly.) If tenured faculty are not exactly quislings,
tenure-holders are certainly complicit and even collaborative in the evisceration of the tenure system.
Thirty-five years ago, only 25% of university instructional staff were non-tenurable; today, it’s closer to
75%.20 Over this time period tenured faculty have essentially pulled the ladder up after themselves,
showing little interest in what was happening in the ranks below—allowing the creation of a multi-tiered
system of labor that mimics what has happened in other spaces (such as domestic automobile
manufacturing) under post-industrial capitalism. Solidarity simply does not exist between tenured
faculty and contingent instructors, who (with even the term “faculty” reserved only for the tenured) do
not possess the language to describe themselves, much less the class consciousness required to see
their situation as anything other than a personal, private misery.
As Bousquet shows, cheap teaching is not a “victimless” crime: the casualization of instructional
labor drags down the value of tenured instruction as well, though tenured faculty have shown no
particular awareness or interest in this fact. Tenured and tenure-track faculty have to behave more and
more like flexible faculty—teaching more sections, publishing more, taking on more and more
noncompensatory “service” work, all in exchange for less compensation than any other professorial
cohort in the history of the modern University. At some English and foreign-language departments, the
bulk of courses are taught by undertrained graduate students without offices, computers, telephones,
or even access to a photocopier, much less airy ideals like “academic freedom” or “contracts that last
longer than a single year.” This sort of alienated, disposable laborer can provide no real resistance to the
long-term casualization of the University itself into “an education-free exchange of cash for credit”21—a
recognition which necessarily invites a harsh contrast with the tenured faculty member who has these
contractual protections and yet does not act.

One disturbing vision of the future of academia comes in Bousquet’s attack on composition
programs, which because of their comparatively late emergence manifest most clearly as a system of
tenured managers and contingent, disposable instructors.22 But this is not inevitable; there are other
possibilities. Bousquet believes collective action on the part of the contingent is the only remedy for a
university in such crisis:
Unorganized graduate employees and contingent faculty have a tendency to grasp their
circumstances less than completely—that is, they feel “treated like shit”—without grasping the
systematic reality that they are waste…. By contrast, the organized graduate employee and
contingent faculty share the grasp of the totality of the system that proceeds from
understanding that they are indeed the waste of that system. They know they are not merely
treated like waste but, in fact, are the actual shit of the system—being churned inexorably
towards the outside: not merely “disposable labor” (Walzer) but labor that must be disposed of
for the system to work. These are persons who can perform acts of blockage.23
Blockage includes acts of political theater like those performed by contingent faculty at Portland
Community College, where adjunct faculty wore sandwich boards labeled “AD-JUNKED FACULTY” while
scheduling meetings with students at outdoor trash cans. It includes blogs like now-vanished “Invisible
Adjunct” and Bousquet’s own howtheuniversityworks.com, which forwards his argument with chapterlength book excerpts, additional commentary, and even a YouTube channel featuring video interviews
with some of the University’s most underpaid information-workers. But blockage includes as its most
immediate and most pressing concern the unionization of graduate employees and contingent faculty, a
goal that begins on its back foot with the 2004 NLRB ruling which concluded that graduate studentworkers at private universities are not, legally speaking, employees and so could not bargain
collectively24—a Bush-era decree that stopped the graduate student unionization movement in its
tracks, at least at private universities, after graduate students were successfully unionized at NYU in
2001. (In accordance with the Brown decision, NYU announced in 2005 that it would no longer negotiate
with that union at all.25)
Questions remain at the end of How the University Works as to the extent to which unionization
alone can solve these problems, especially in the face of continued apathy from tenured faculty. It’s
telling that in cases where graduate student unionization has been successful, organizational support
has tended to come not from tenured faculty but from maintenance and service unions—groups whose
situation, it must be admitted, Bousquet shows comparatively little interest in, at least in this book.
Would Bousquet’s proposed “dictatorship of the flexible” include the entire campus, faculty, students,
and service workers alike—or would contingent faculty, once ascendant, perform their own act of
pulling the ladder up behind them? We should hope it would be the former, but that is by no means
clear.
Likewise, might this book’s critique be different if it were titled (say) How Capitalism Works or
How America Works? To what extent would the restoration of adequate compensation and contractual
protections to contingent faculty merely signal the restoration of a particular set of class privileges that
historically have been unique to the middle and upper classes? At times Bousquet’s comparisons—that,
for instance, after twenty years of labor the English professor still earns less than an accountant, civil
servant, public-school teacher, or entry-level lawyer—can leave the impression that the problem is less
that unjust class stratifications exist than that contingent faculty have been slotted at the wrong level.

In other words, if “your problem” is really “my problem”—and I agree it is—don’t the problems
of late capitalism and flex labor go far beyond this particular mode of exploitation? When asked a
version of this question during his own visit to Duke in 2008, Bousquet’s answer spoke to the pressing
need for activism to become local and personal, something one does for one’s own benefit and not (as it
is sometimes figured, especially on college campuses) some act of charity towards others—the need, in
other words, for the theorist to “embody the critique personally.”26 And unquestionably there’s
something to be said for this. But we should be glad, too, that posts on Bousquet’s blog, comments
during his lecture tour, and the suggestive title of his planned follow-up (Child Labor Campus) give good
reason to think that the next book will embrace a more global perspective—global, that is, in all senses
of the word. Bousquet is absolutely right that the University is not some victim of late capitalism, but,
indeed, makes late capitalism happen—which makes the coming to class consciousness of contingent
faculty and their struggle for decent labor conditions a beginning to resistance, not its end.
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